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The purpose of t h i s  repor t  i s  t o  present range s a f e t y  
da ta  f o r  t he  Saturn SA-10 vehicle .  
standard t r a j e c t o r y  t o  be published by R-AERO-FM. It has 
a f i r i n g  azimuth of 9 5 . 2  degrees e a s t  of t r u e  north and 
goes i n t o  o r b i t  a t  an a l i t u d e  of 289 nau t i ca l  m i l e s .  The 
standard and dispers ions have been provided on magnetic tape.  
This study i s  based on the  
One of the  primary object ives  f o r  t h e  SA-10 vehic le  i s  
t o  place the Pegasus (Micrometeoroid) sa te l l i te  i n t o  a 
c i r c u l a r  o r b i t .  Other primary vehic le  object ives  are the 
fu r the r  f l i g h t  t e s t i n g  of t he  S-I  and S-IV s t r u c t u r e ,  pro- 
pulsion, cont ro l  systems, s.-I/S-IV separa t ion  sequence, 
and closed loop guidance during S-IV f l i g h t .  
vehic le  objec t ives  are t o  obtain Apollo b o i l e r p l a t e  da t a ,  
fu r the r  tests of the  Launch Escape System (LES), and 
general  Apollo development. 
Additional 
The r e l i a b i l i t y  analysis  of t he  S-IV-8 and S-IV-10 
s tages  w a s  performed by Douglas Ai rc ra f t ,  and i s  presented 
i n  the  Appendix. 
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Definition 
Time of engine cutoff 
Angle of attack 
Magnitudes of the components of the 
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missile's velocity in the earth-fixed X, 
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Mach number 
L-ngftiirlinal lnad factor 
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GEORGE C. MARSHALL SPACE F'LIGHT CENTW 
RANGE SAFFlly DATA FOR SATURN SA-10 
The da ta  presented i n  t h i s  report are f o r  t h e  Saturn 
SA-10 vehic le ,  wi th  a f i r i n g  azimuth of 95.2 degrees east 
of t r u e  north.  
This r epor t  is based on a standard t r a j e c t o r y  t o  be 
published by R-AERO-FM, with o ther  p e r t i n e n t  information 
furnished by R-P&VE and Douglas A i r c r a f t  Campany. 
The da ta  submitted cons is t s  of boos te r  and Launch 
Escape System impact areas,  e f f e c t s  of range s a f e t y  
terminat ion,  land impact p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  i n j u r y  p r o b a b i l i t i e s ,  
and turning rate e f f e c t s .  Graphs of tu rn ing  rates and 
ear th-f ixed ve loc i ty  as a func t ion  of t i m e ,  after malfunction 
is  introduced, are given f o r  t he  S-I and S-N s tages .  
Data cons i s t ing  of  standard,  2 3  Q dispers ions ,  and 
booster  f r e e  f l i g h t  t r a j e c t o r i e s  have been forwarded t o  the 
C a p e  on magnetic tape  as requested by Range Safety.  
The i t e r a t i v e  guidance w a s  used i n  t h e  second s tages  
f o r  the standard and - + 3 u dispers ion  t r a j e c t o r i e s .  
c 
2 
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of t h i s  repor t  i s  t o  present  range s a f e t y  da t a  f o r  
Saturn SA-10 vehicle .  
f i n a l  standard t r a j e c t o r y  t o  be published by R-AERO-FM. 
The da ta  presented he re in  are based on t h e  
The engines t o  be  used fo r  t he  f i r s t  s t age  i n  Saturn SA-10 have 
a sea  l eve l  th rus t  of 188,000 pounds (836,000 newtons) each. 
inner  four engines have a f ixed  cant  angle of 3" t o  the  missile ax i s .  
The outer  engines, which a r e  f r e e  t o  swivel f o r  con t ro l ,  a r e  canted 
6" t o  t h e  missile ax is .  The second s t age  has s i x  R L - 1 O A 3  engines 
which have a vacuum t h r u s t  of 15,000 pounds (66,700 newtons) each. 
The 
This report  was based on the  t r a j e c t o r y  having an aiming azimuth 
of 95.2 degrees East-of-North with an i n s e r t i o n  a l t i t u d e  of 535 
ki lometers .  
SECTION 11. DESCRIPTION 
A. Standard Tra jec tory  Variat ions 
The va r i a t ions  of t he  standard t r a j e c t o r y  are l i s t e d  below: 
(1)  3 4  Maximum +2% F, +1% i , + E x  Wind, -3,500 lbm i n  1st Stage 
F, +1% r R , - l , O O O  lbm i n  2nd Stage 7 
, -1% i, -E Wind, +3,500 lbm i n  1st Stag 
-1% A, +lo08 lbm i n  2nd Stage 
( 2 )  3 ,.( Minimum 
(3)  3 T  La te ra l  +Ez Wind, Motor #4 out a t  100 sec  i n  1st Stage c No crossrange guidance i n  2nd Stage 
(4 )  Extreme La te ra l  &Ez Wind, Motor 114 out a t  0 s e c .  
(5)  Steepest  1+2% - F, +I% h, Headwind, -3,500 lbm] 
(6)  F l a t t e s t  h o t o r  414 out a t  0 s e c ,  Ta i lw ing  
, .- 
In  addi t ion  t o  impacts given every second on t h e  Cape Tape, 
impacts w i l l  b e  given i n  t abu la r  form every 20 seconds u n t i l  near 
o r b i t a l  condi t ions,  t h e r e a f t e r ,  a t  1 second i n t e r v a l s  f o r  t he  s tandard,  
3 ~ -  maximum, and 3 6  minimum. 
i n  the  tab les :  instantaneous cu tof f  time, geodet ic  l a t i t u d e ,  longi tude,  
remaining f l i g h t  t ime, and range along the  su r face  of t he  e a r t h  from 
launch t o  impact. 
The following parameters w i l l  be given 




B. (U) Effects of Range Safety Flight Termination 
I f  the vehicle, for  purposes of range safety,  i s  t o  be  destroyed 
i n  ear ly  f l i g h t  phase, the most probable pieces, according t o  P&VE 
and DAC, are considered t o  be the follawi&: 
Mass 
A!& 
(a) S-I Stage (1) 54,940 
(b) S-IV Stage (1) 6,271 
(c) 4-Engine C lus t e r  (1) 2,818 
(d) Single Engine (8) 880 
(e) Instrument Canister (1) 228 
( f )  Fragment of S-I Barrel 227 
(g) Fragment of S-I Tail 136 
34 
(2) - (1) 1,285 
(j) Camuand Module Without 4,203 
(k) Fragment of S-I Barrel 23 
(1) 70" Diameter Tank 1,768 
(m) Turbopump Assembly 181 




(h) Fragment of S-I Heat 
LES 
Sections (1) 
( 0 )  Forward Dame Skin 453 
(p) Cylindrical Tank Skin 97 
(q) Cammn Bulkhead 244 
(r) A f t  Interstage and Sk i r t  
( 8 )  Upper Portion of Aft Dame 










































































NOTE: Figure i n  parenthesis a f t e r  (a) through (i) indicates number of 
cs - cross sectibnal;  m- mean; p - planiform pieces. 
For the maximum and minimum distance pieces, the approximate drag can 
be calculated as D = CDqA. The CD curves are given i n  Figures 3 - 13. 
*Pieces (n) through (t) are representative pieces given by DAC for  the 
s-I\' stzgz. (see !+pedi,x.) 
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C. (U) Tracking Equipment 
SA-10 has the following onboard antenna locations : 
VHF Telemetry Antenna 
Sta. 909.929 
S-I Stage 
5.75' II+I 5.75' IIjIII 
5.75" IVJIII 5.75O IV+I 




5'10' IV I 
Command Antenna 
Sta. 868.6 S-I Stage 
5'30' I+IV , 5O30' IjII 
5'30' IIIjII 5'30' III+IV 
Command Aht enna IU 
Sta. 1471.889 28"07'30" I+IV 
28 "07 ' 30'' IIIj'II 
ODOP Receiving Antenna 
S ta . 1483.424 33O45' IjIV 









4'38'30'' IV jIII 
Command Antenna System 
Sta. 1384.157 
Fins I1 & IV (Transverse) 
Fins I & I11 (Longitudinal) 
Telemetry Antenna System 
Sta. 1423.092 
S-IV Stage 
Fins I & I11 (Transverse) 














D. (U) Wind Disturbances 
For t h i s  ana lys i s ,  the  winds considered a r e  the  3 cs winds 
published by W. W. Vaughan, M-AERO-F-53-63, "Cape Canaveral, Flor ida,  
Wind P r o f i l e  Envelopes f o r  Selected F l ight  Azimuth," March 28, 1963. 
(See Figure 1.) 
E. (U) Vehicle Velocity Turning Angle Inves t iga t ion  
The vehic le  ve loc i ty  vector turning da ta  for t h e  standard is 
presented i n  Figures 19-72. These f igures  give the  r eo r i en ta t ion  
of the  t o t a l  ve loc i ty  vector  i n  the l a t e r a l  d i r ec t ion  as  a funct ion 
of t i m e  once the  malfunction (engine gimbal def lec t ion)  i n  yaw is 
introduced. 
In the  pas t ,  an inves t iga t ion  w a s  made of t he  r eo r i en ta t ion  of 
t h e  ve loc i ty  vector  i n  the  v e r t i c a l  plane (&, Ye). 
a t  t h e  time the  malfunction (engine gimbal def lec t ion)  was introduced 
i n  pi tch.  Under these conditions,  t he re  i s  no s i g n i f i c a n t  d i f fe rence  
i n .  turning r a t e s  i n  the  la te r ' a l  d i r ec t ion  and the  p i t ch  plane; thus ,  
only l a t e r a l  turning r a t e s  a r e  given. The l a t e r a l  tu rn ing  r a t e s  a r e  
synnnetrical; hence, the vehic le  was only yawed t o  the  r i g h t .  
Gravity was removed 
When yaw turning r a t e s  a r e  inves t iga ted ,  t he  engine gimbal . 
def l ec t ion  angle i n  p i t ch  (beta  p) is set a t  zero degrees def lec t ion .  
The yaw malfunction chosen i s  held f ixed throughout any s p e c i f i c  
inves t iga t ion .  
t r a j e c t o r i e s  given on tape by use of t he  following time equivalent 
r e l a t i o n s .  
These turning r a t e s  can be  t r ans l a t ed  t o  the 23 (J 
Standard Trajectory,  Maximum Trajectory , Minimum Trajectory,  
Time of Turning Time of Turning Time of Turning 
















The r e l a t i v e  ve loc i ty  of the turning r a t e  cases is  given as 
a funct ion of time in Figures 73-126. 
6 
F. (U)  Downrange Land Impact Probabi l i ty  
S t a t i s t i c a l  da ta  i n  regard t o  impact r e s u l t i n g  from malfunctions 
which occur during the  l a t e  phase of t h e  second s t age  i s  presented. 
For these  calculat ions, .  it was assumed t h a t  f i r s t  s t age  functioned 
properly and t h a t  second s t age  f a i l e d  t o  reach o r b i t a l  condi t ions.  
It was assumed t h a t  t h e  p robab i l i t y  of t he  veh ic l e  dropping s h o r t  i s  
approximately .13 f o r  the  second s t age ;  t h i s  is based on da ta  given 
i n  Appendix 1 The instantaneous impact  
t i m e  ( a t )  over land on the95.2" s tandard t r a j e c t o r y  i s  approximately 
4.9 s e c .  
by DAC f o r  the  S-IV s t age .  
A 3 0 corr idor  was determined f o r  the  overland f l i g h t  (Figure 1 6 )  
impacting the  veh ic l e  by taking the root  sum square of t h e  following: 
a f t e r  i t  turned with a maximum rate u n t i l  alpha yaw had reached 180"; 
impacting the 30  
taking the  most c r i t i c a l  p iece ,  i n j e c t i n g  a +E, wind and the  v e l o c i t y  
increment i n  t h e  +Z d i r e c t i o n  and impacting the  piece.* 
a r e  shown i n  t h e  t a b l e  below. 
l a t e r a l  case;  assuming t h a t  t he  veh ic l e  had exploded, 
These r e s u l t s  
WIDTH OF RIGHT SIDE OF 3 u CORRIDOR I N  N. M I .  
Turning Rates Wind + AVeloc i ty  Motor #4 out  100 s e c  Resul tant  
(Vacuum) (Drag Considered) (Vacuum) For Right 
Right S i d e  Right Side Right Side Side 
20 55 10 59.4 
Cross Range (n.mi.) Cross Range (n.mi.) Cross Range (n.mi.) (RCR) 
*Piece ( 0 )  i n  paragraph B. 
The probabi l i ty  of impacting on land can be ca l cu la t ed  as follows: 
- 
PI - probabi l i ty  of impacting on land 
A t  - dwell time 
TB - t o t a l  burn t i m e  of second s t age  
PF probabi l i ty  of any f a i l u r e  causing t h e  2nd s t a g e  t o  drop s h o r t  




I C  
'p 
c 
Impact probabi l i t ies  f o r  individual countries are as follows : 
Land Area Dwell Time &pact Probabili ty 
Angola 2.8 7.6 X 10- 







8.1 X 10' 
5.3 x 10'. Madqascar .2 
G. Probabili ty of Injuring a Person 
The probabili ty of injur ing a person downrange can be determined 
i n  the following manner: 
'IP - probabili ty of injuring person 
- - population density of country (people per sq. m i . )  
L 
- lethal area (sq. I$.) 
Based on Appendix by Douglas, the S-IV stage has approximately 
3,000 sq. f t .  of lethal area. 
contributed by the piepe fallins a t  en 
t h e  projected l e t h a l  e f f e c t  on a person. 
This includes the  addi t ional  area 
~f 1" t~ -:=r+-lsdl ~2 
A sample calculation: Forward Inters tage Assembly: A = 185 f t z ;  
Nuder of pieces = 8 A = 185 = 23.12 
Pieces 3- 
Assuming this piece t o  be square, one s ide  = 23.12 = 4.808 f t .  
8 
Assume an average man i s  6 f t .  t a l l  and t h i s  piece comes i n  a t  15" t o  
the  v e r t i c a l .  15" 
(6 f t . )  (4.808) = 7.7 ft2. 
by 8 pieces ,  w e  g e t  t he  t o t a l  l e t h a l  a rea  as 246.5 f t 2  f o r  the  forward 
i n t e r s t a g e  assembly. Then, i n  addi t ion ,  w e  should assume t h a t  t h e  
dense pieces could impact on hard sur faces ,  giving an estimated 
s p l a t t e r  e f f e c t  of an addi t iona l  2,000 sq. f t .  Thus, t h e  approximate 
t o t a l  l e t h a l  area of t h e  S-IV-10 s t age  i s  conservat ively estimated t o  
be 5,000 sq. f t .  
The l e t h a l  area of t h i s  piece i s  increased by tan.  
Adding t h i s  t o  23.12 f t 2  and multiplying 
The probabi l i ty  of i n ju r ing  a person by overf lying land i s :  
PIP = .0013 X 20 X 5 * O o o  = 4.7 x 10-6 
27,878,400 
Probabi l i ty  of i n ju r ing  Person f o r  ind iv idua l  countr ies :  
(3 /devia t ion)  (Sectors 1 and 2 ,  Figure 16) 
L 
Country 
Ango la  









Pr ob ab i li t y  
(People per of In jur ing  
sq. mi , . )  a Person P, 
7. 6X10'4 25 3.4 x 10-6 
2.61~10'~ 1 4.7 x 10-9 
5 .3x10-~ 2 1  2.0 x 
4 .1~10-4  12 8.8 X 10-7 
5 .  ~ 1 0 ' ~  25 3.6 X 10-7 
l imi t a t ions  and t h e  l ike l ihood of occurence, 
i t  was desired t o  determine t h e  absolu te  maximum lateral  devia t ion  t h a t  
could be  obtained from a malfunction t h a t  could occur a f t e r  reaching 
t h e  "gate" ( I I P  reaches land) .  
yaw ( @ y )  t o  t h e  l e f t  and a l s o  have a v a r i a t i o n  i n  t h e  p i t c h  ( @ p  ) 
plane. 
condi t ions,  t h e  following impacts a r e  obtained. 
The veh ic l e  w a s  assumed t o  instantaneously 




Variations I m p a c e  




1 5 -70 -16.1 -34.4 
2 5 -80 -6.7 -14.2 
3 -5 -70 -16.3 -35 .o 
4 -5 -80 -10.8 -22.3 
5 - 15 - 70 -14.0 -30.0 
These are sketched i n  Figure16. 
probabi l i t i es ,  we have the  following impact and injury probabi l i ty  
in sectors  3 and 4. 
Then, i n  addition t o  the  above 
- N Probability of 
LA Injuring a Person PI - Country 
Ango l a  1.9 x 25 8.5 x IO-' 
South West Africa 9.1 x 24 2.9 x 
Union South Africa 3.3 x 24 1.4 x 
Basu t o land 1.1 x 50 9.9 x 10-l0 
Bechvanaland 7.0 x 1 1.3 X 10-l' 
Mozamb i que 2.2 x lom7 17 6.7 X 10-l' - 10 
Madagascar 1.3 x 25 5.8 X 10 
Rhodesia & Nyasaland 1.0 x 12 2.2 x IO-' 
The probabili ty of impacting outside of sectors  3 and 4 in Figure 
is  Zero with the present propellant loading and range safe ty  act ion 
being taken before the T h i c l e  reaches the "gate." 
*Based on superimposed corridor from SA-8. 
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H. Sequence of Events 
Given below a r e  the  times t h a t  the  major events occur during 
t h e  nominal case:  
Nominal Sequence of Events 
Time of Event 


















L i f t  o f f  
I n i t i a t e  Rol l  and Pi tch  Simultaneously 
Terminate Rol l  
S- I  Stage Propel lant  Level Sensors Enabled 
T i l t  Arrest  
S-I  Stage Level Sensor S igna l  
Inboard Cutoff (S-I  Stage) 
Outboard Cutoff (S-I Stage) 
Ullage Rocket Ignition(S-IV Stage)  
Separat ion,  Immediately Followed by Retro 
Ign i t ion  (S-I Stage)  
S-IV Mainstage I g n i t i o n  
J e t t i s o n  Ullage Rocket Casing and LES 
I n i t i a t e  Active Guidance 
Signal  from Sequencer t o  Arm LOX Depletion 
Cutoff Capabi l i ty  
S-IV Stage Main Engine Cutoff 






I. Booster Impact 
Further cursory investigation by R-P&VE-V on the re-entry of the  
S-I boost s tage a f t e r  separation confirms tha t  the major pieces o f s i t  
w i l l  remain i n t a c t  as it re-enters the atmosphere. 
it i s  possible for  t h in  metal pieces (panels, etc.) weighing less than 
50 lbm t o  break loose from the S-I stage upon re-entry. 
the  following booster impact analysis has been performed. 
However, they s t a t e  
Based on t h i s ,  
The booster and a representative piece as described ( th in  metal 
piece) were impacted. .The applicable drag w a s  used for  the t r a j ac to r i e s  
and the  appropriate winds w e r e  applied. 
the impact dispersion points, which are as follows: 
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J. LES Impact 
An ana lys i s  concerning LES impact has been performed and Figure 17  
gives  t h e  e l l i p s e .  
w a s  e j ec t ed  10.3 seconds a f t e r  i g n i t i o n  of t h e  S-IV-10 s t a g e  from t h e  
& 3 dispers ion  t r a j e c t o r i e s  given on magnetic tape.  The impacts 
were as follows : 
The e l l ipse  w a s  determined as follows. The LES 
. Trajec tory  Lat i tude  Longitude 
Standard 26.9446 69.3584 
3 a Maximum 26.7964 68.6319 
3 u Minimum 27.0937 70.0891 
3 u L a t e r a l  26.7359 70.1045 
K. Pad Area Study 
For t h i s  s tudy the  e f f e c t s  of Vehicle tu rn ing  rates, v e l o c i t y  
increment due t o  des t ruc t  and a wind from 67.5" E of N w e r e  combined t o  
give t h e  maximum devia t ion  toward t h e  i n d u s t r i a l  a rea .  
t h i s  s tudy ind ica t e  that ,  t o  avoid any impact of m a x i m u m  d i s t ance  p ieces  
due t o  des t ruc t ,  on c r i t i c a l  a r eas ,  t h e  wind p r o f i l e  given i n  Figure 1-A 
should not  be exeeded. The p robab i l i t y  of t h e  67.5" E of N wind, exceeding 
the p r o f i l e  given i n  Figure l - A  i s  l e s s  than 10% based on R-AERO-Y's 
wind p r o f i l e  f o r  the  month of August. ' 
The r e s u l t s  of 
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RANGE SAFETY FLIGHT TERMINATION SYSTEM 
- 
4.1 .Descr ip t ion  and Function 
"he RSFT (range s a f e t y  flight t e rmina t ion )  system ( f i g u r e s  4-1 and 4-21, 
( e l e c t r i c a l  and ordnance),  is a dual  system which provides  a high degree of 
r e l i a b i l i t y .  
and causing fuel d i spe r s ion  i n  t h e  event of e r r a t i c  performance of t h e  
veh ic l e .  
Each system is  capable of imposing a cond i t ion  of .  ze ro  t h rus t  , 
I n  a d d i t i o n  t o  various antenna systems and w i r e  bundles ,  t h e  RSFT 
system c o n s i s t s  of t h e  following major components: 









Command d e s t r u c t  r e c e i v e r s  
RSFT system c o n t r o l l e r  
Power d i s t r i b u t i o n  boxes 
EBW e l e c t r o n i c  f i r i n g  u n i t s  
Sa fe ty  and arming device 
E B W  detonators  
Explosive harness  assemblies 
Linear  shaped charges 
Refer t o  Sec t ion  3,  Explosive Ordnance and Assoc ia ted  E l e c t r i c a l  Systems, 
f o r  d e s c r i p t i o n  and func t ion  of t h e  aforementioned items. 
The or'dnance p o r t i o n  of t h e  system c o n s i s t s  of E B W  de tona to r s ,  
explos ive  harness  assembl ies ,  and l i n e a r  shaped charges.  The de tona tors  , 
through t h e  s a f e t y  and arming device, de tona te  small charges i n  t h e  ends of 
t h e  explos ive  harness  assemblies.  The harness  assemblies propagate t h e  
de tona t ion  t o  t h e  l i n e a r  shaped charges mounted on t h e  side of t h e  M 2  tank 
and t h e  bottom of t h e  LOX tank .  
+%nkc, Ellnving +.he Frope l l an t s  t o  d i spe r se .  I n  a d d i t i o n ,  an explos ive  
Exploding t h e  shaped charges rup tu res  t h e  
harness  in t e r sonnec t ion  i s  provided between t h e  d e s t r u c t  systems of t h e  S-I 
and S-IV s t a g e s .  
t h e  exp los ive  in t e rconnec t ion  blocks. 
The RSFT e l e c t r i c a l  c i r c u i t r y  is loca ted  i n  t h e  forward s e c t i o n  of t h e  S-IV 
stage and c o n s i s t s  of t h e  power supp l i e s ,  d e s t r u c t  -system c o n t r o l l e r ,  power 
d i s t r i b u t i o n  box and t h e  EBW e l e c t r o n i c  f i r i n g  u n i t s .  A s e p a r a t e  c i r c u i t  
c o n t r o l l e d  from t h e  ground permi ts  swi tch ing  the  s a f e t y  and arming device 
This i n t e rconnec t ion  i s  s i n g u l a r  on the .  S-I s t a g e  s i d e  of 
Prijiii GEE p ~ ~ l t l ~ ~  tc z z ~ t h e r .  
19 April  1967 
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Accidental  de tona t ion  of t h e  l i n e a r  shaped charges during p r e f l i g h t  cnecIEouz 
ope ra t ions  on t h e  launch pad i s  prevented f o r  most of  t h e  t i m e  by t h e  s a f e t y  
and' arming device which maintains an out  of l i n e  condi t ion i n  t h e  explosive 
t r a i n s .  
i s  r e l ega ted  t o  t h e  launch pad and i s  switched t o  t h e  arm condi t ion j u s t  
before l i f t o f f ,  b u t  i s  monitored both e l e c t r i c a l l y  and v i s u a l l y  on, a panel  
i n  t h e  blockhouse. The f i r i n g  units are charged only af ter  launch i n  t h e  
event of  a dec i s ion  t o  i n i t i a t e  f l i g h t  t e rmina t ion ,  
However, t h e  switching funct ion of  t h e  device which i s  s i n g u l a r ,  
4.2 Operation 
4.2.1 
The EBW e l e c t r o n i c  f i r i n g  u n i t s  ( 2 )  w i l l  not be charged on 'the ground. 
"not ready" cond i t ion  of t h e  f i r i n g  u n i t s  w i l l  be  i n d i c a t e d  on t h e  S-IV, 
stage d e s t r u c t  panel  ( f i g u r e  4-3). The s a f e t y  and arming device w i l l  be 
cycled t o  the  armed p o s i t i o n  approximately 3 minutes p r i o r  t o  l i f t o f f  and 
t h e  condi t ions v e r i f i e d  on t h e  S-IV d e s t r u c t  pane l .  
F ina l  Arming P r i o r  t o  Launch 
A 
4.2.2 Arming A f t e r  Launch 
If af ter  l i f t o f f ,  t h e  veh ic l e  dev ia t e s  from t h e  p r e d i c t e d  f l i g h t  path t o  t h e  
e x t e n t  t h a t  a hazardous condi t ion e x i s t s ,  t h e  RSFT system i n  t h e  S-IV s t a g e  
d e l i v e r s  t he  r equ i r ed  f l i g h t  t e rmina t ion  command by decoding frequency- 
modulated s i g n a l s  received from a ground t r a n s m i t t e r .  These UHF s i g n a l s  a r e  
r ece ived  by t h e  S-IV s t a g e  antenna system, provides  omnidirect ional  coverage 
about t h e  veh ic l e  r ega rd le s s  of i t s  a t t i t u d e .  Two comman'd d e s t r u c t  r e c e i v e r s  
are l o c a t e d  i n  t h e  forward i n t e r s t a g e  area of t h e  S-IV s t a g e .  Each r e c e i v e r  
r e l a y s  a s i g n a l  t o  t h e  S-IV s t a g e  d e s t r u c t  system c o n t r o l l e r .  The s i g n a l  
from e i t h e r  r e c e i v e r  i s  capable of a c t i v a t i n g  t h e  c o n t r o l l e r  f o r  t h e  
detonat ion of  t h e  l i n e a r  shaped charges.  
4.2.3 Range S a f e t y  F l i g h t  Termination 
Range safety f l i g h t  t e rmina t ion  i s  i n i t i a t e d '  by t h e  range s a f e t y  oft'icei- i t '  
a f te r  l i f t o f f ,  t h e  veh ic l e  dev ia t e s  from t h e  p r e d i c t e d  f l i g h t  path to tlie 
e x t e n t  t h a t  a hazardous cond i t ion  e x i s t s .  The fol lowing sequence i s  
i n i t i a t e d  by c l o s i n g  t h e  d e s t r u c t  switch i n  t h e  launch c o n t r o l  c e n t e r :  
92 
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a. me command t r a n s m i t t e r  sends an FM, audio-coded s i g n a l  t o  t h e  
veh ic l e .  
b. The r ece iv ing  antennas t r a n s f e r  t h e  s i g n a l  t o  t h e  command d e s t r u c t  
r ece ive r .  
c .  The cormnand d e s t r u c t  r e c e i v e r  demodulates and decodes t h e  s i g n a l ;  
t h e  commands are f ed  t o  t h e  command d e s t r u c t  c o n t r o l l e r .  
d. The command d e s t r u c t  c o n t r o l l e r  i n i t i a t e s  engine c u t o f f  through t h e  
f l i g h t  sequeri5er and subsequently t r i g g e r s  t h e  f i r i n g  u n i t s .  
e. The f i r i n g  u n i t s  a c t i v a t e  t h e  high vol tage  de tona tors .  
f .  The de tona tors  explosion is propagated by t h e  explos ive  harness  
assemblies and t h e  l i n e a r  shaped charges.  
shaped charges mounted on t h e  ou t s ide  of t h e  LH2 and LOX tarks, 
fup tu res  t h e  tanks pe rmi t t i ng  f u e l  d i spers ion .  
Explosion o f  t h e  l i n e a r  
t 
19 Apr i l  1965 
93 
18 
Sect ion 4 
Range Sa fe ty  F l igh t  Termination System 
n 
4 






Range Safety Flight Termination System 
a zBm I 
19 April 1965 
Figure 4-2 
20 
Sect ion 4 






19 April 1965 
21 
c 
EFFECTS OF W X ; E  SAFETY FLIGHT TERMIPJAT1OF.I 
Sect ion ‘5 
E f f e c t s  of Range Safe ty  F l i g h t  Termination 
22 
5 .  EFFECTS OF RANGE SAFETY FLIGHT TERMINATION (RSFT) 
5 . 1  General 
The S-IV s t a g e  can be destroyed i n  f l i g h t  by t h e  range s a f e t y  f l i g h t  
terminat ion (RSFT) system. I n  order  t o  d iscuss  t h e  d e s t r u c t i v e  e f f e c t  of 
t h e  system on t h e  s t a g e ,  t h e  s t a g e  t o t a l  f l i g h t  t i m e  has  been d iv ided  i n t o  
t h r e e  f l i g h t  phases (1) before  S-11s-IV s e p a r a t i o n ,  ( 2 )  a f t e r  S-I/S-IV 
separa t ion  with S-IV s t a g e  propel lan t  tanks n e a r l y  f u l l ,  and 
S-11s-IV separa t ion  with S-IV s t a g e  propel lan t  tanks n e a r l y  empty. 
( 3 )  af ter  
5 . 2  Ef fec ts  of RSFT Before S tage ,  Separat ion 
I n i t i a t i o n  o f  RSFT before  s t a g e  separa t ion  w i l l  r e s u l t  i n  one o f  t h r e e  
s i t u a t i o n s :  (1) t h e  s t a g e  w i l l  break up and i t s  p r o p e l l a n t s  w i l l  detonate, 
( 2 )  t h e  s t a g e  w i l l  break up but  i t s  p r o p e l l a n t s  w i l l  not de tona te ,  and 
( 3 )  t h e  s t a g e  w i l l  not  break up. 
and t h e  propel lan ts  w i l l  mix and detonate  and t h a t  breakup w i l l  be caused 
e i t h e r  by aerodynamic l o a d s ,  tumbling i n e r t i a l  l o a d s ,  o r  by forces  c r e a t e d  
by t h e  d e s t r u c t i o n  of  t h e  S-I s t a g e .  
s t a g e  may break up and not detonate  i s  considered,  as is  t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  
t h e  s t a g e  may not break up a t  a l l .  
DAC b e l i e v e s  t h a t  s t a g e  breakup w i l l  occur 
However, t h e  p o s s i b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  
5 . 2 . 1  Stage Breaks Up With Propel lan t  Detonation 
Breakup of t h e  S-IV s t a g e  with propel lan t  de tona t ion  can occur only as a 
r e s u l t  of  S-I s t a g e  d e s t r u c t i o n  and p r o p e l l a n t  explosion.  I n  t h i s  c a s e ,  
t h e  debr i s  f a l l i n g  from t h e  s t a g e  w i l l  c o n s i s t  of t h e  fol lowing p ieces :  
( I t  i s  recommended t h a t  f o r  range s a f e t y  purposes ,  it be assumed t h a t  a l l  
debr i s  w i l l  surv ive  re-entry i n t o  t h e  atmosphere).  
a. Skin p ieces  (maximum s i z e  10 f t2)  o r i g i n a t i n g  from t h e  s k i n  s e c t i o n s  
descr ibed i n  f i g u r e  5-1 and t a b l e s  5-1 and 5-2. 
b .  Ind iv idua l  RLlOA-3 rocket  engines ,  i n c l u d i n g  hydraul ic  a c t u a t o r s .  
c .  Ullage rockets-loaded. 
d. Ullage rockets-expended. 
e .  Helium h e a t e r .  
f .  Base hea t  s h i e l d .  
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h. 
i. 
J .  
k. 
1. 
E l e c t r o n i c s  rack and u n i t s  (1 p i e c e )  l o c a t e d  on t h e  forward 
i n t e r s t a g e  assembly. 
E lec t ron ic s  u n i t s ,  such as t h e  ins t rumenta t ion  s i g n a l  cond i t ion ing  
equipment, l o c a t e d  outs ide of t h e  t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e .  
Thrust s t r u c t u r e  ( inc lud ing  e l e c t r i c  equipment and accesso r i e s  
i n s i d e ,  and t h a t  po r t ion  of t h e  a f t  dome t h a t  extends below t h e  
t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e  junc t ion ;  exc luding  engines ,  e x t e r n a l  e l e c t r o n i c  
packages, helium h e a t e r ,  and c o n t r o l  helium sphere ) . 
Cold helium spheres .  
LH2 tank makeup helium sphere. 
Pneumatic c o n t r o l  helium sphere 
It should be emphasized t h a t  t h e  number of p i eces  are es t ima tes  only,  based 
p r imar i ly  on d a t a  obta ined  from vehicles  p rev ious ly  destroyed i n  f l i g h t .  
More accu ra t e  e s t ima tes  can be  obtained only by conducting f u l l - s c a l e  tests. 
5.2.2 
If t h e  s t a g e  breakup does occur without a p r o p e l l a n t  de tona t ion ,  breakup 
Would be caused by aerodynamic and tumbling i n e r t i a l  loads.  The p r o p e l l a n t s  
w i l l  vaporize a t  ambient p re s su re ,  and temperature and t h e  following s k i n  
p i eces  and components w i l l  f a l l  as debr i s .  
energy imparted t o  it. ) 
Stage Breaks Up Without Propel lant  Detonat ion 






Skin p i eces  from t h e  S-IV s t a g e .  
Ind iv idua l  RLlOA-3 rocket engines ,  i nc lud ing  t h e i r  hydraul ic  
a c t u a t o r s  (only is t n e  engines ~ r - t . & i  vff  i=t C V ~  t h r ~ s +  s+.mirt.iireI. 
RLlOA-3 rocket  engine,  t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e ,  helium h e a t e r ,  and p o r t i o n  
of af t  dome extending below t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e  junc t ion  (only i f  
engines do not break off at t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e ) .  
Ullage rockets-loaded. 
E lec t ron ic s  rack and units (one p i e c e )  l o c a t e d  on forward i n t e r s t a g e  
assembly (only i f  rack breaks o f f  at t h e  forward i n t e r s t a g e  
assemlijr; . 
19 A p r i l  1965 
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f .  Electronics un i t s ,  such as t h e  instrumentation s igna l  conditioning 
equipment, located outside of the  th rus t  s t ruc ture  (only i f  t he  
I units break o f f  a t  t he  th rus t  s t ruc ture) .  
Section 5. 
Effects of Range Safety Flight Termination 
g. Thrust s t ruc ture ,  including electronic equipment accessories mounted 
inside and a t  t h a t  portion of the  aft  dome extending below the 
thrus t  s t ruc ture  junction; excluding engines, external electronics 
packages, helium heater and control helium sphere (only i f  t he  
excluded uni t s  break of f  a t  t he  th rus t  s t ruc tu re ) ,  
h.  Cold helium spheres. 
i. LH2 tank pressure makeup sphere. 
j. Pneumatic control helium sphere. 
k. H e l i u m  heater. 
1. A l l  s t ruc ture  forward of DAC s t a t i o n  337.781, including useful load. 
m. Base heat shield.  
5.2.3 
If the  stage does not break up, the only pieces of debris t h a t  may be 
released by the explosives w i l l  be very small pieces of skin plus the  s ide  
tunnel cover. 
Stage Does Not Break Up 
5.3 
It i s  believed t h a t  i n i t i a t i o n  of RSFT when t h e  propellant tanks of t he  
S-IV stage are nearly f u l l ,  w i l l  not cause stage breakup s ince  the  forces 
created by the RSFT explosives are probably not strong enough t o  def lec t  t he  
s tage  and cause tumbling. 
propellants w i l l  probably not burst  t he  tanks, 
propellants may not occur, the  propellants w i l l  vaporize at ambient pressure 
and temperature. 
W i l l  be very small pieces of skin and t h e  s ide  tunnel cover. 
Effects of RSFT After Stage Separation With Propell'ant Tanks Nearly Fu l l  
Furthermore, t h e  hydrostatic pressures of t h e  
Although burning of t he  
The only pieces t h a t  may be released by the  explosives 
5.4 Effects of RSFT After Stage Separation With Propellant Tanks Nearly 
Empty 
It .la believed t h a t  i n i t i a t i o n  of RSFT when the  propellant tanks are nearly 
empty w i l l  cause stage breakup because of forces created by the  release of 
19 April  1965 
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l a r g e  volumes of  compressed gases from t h e  t anks .  This stage breakup should 
be less ex tens ive  than s t a g e  breakup before  sepa ra t ion  when t h e  p r o p e l l a n t s  
do not  detonate .  I t  i s  a n t i c i p a t e d  t h a t  t h e  p i eces  d i spe r sed  a t  t h i s  t i m e  
w i l l  be as follows: 
a. Skin p i eces  from t h e  S-IV s t a g e .  
b. Ind iv idua l  !?LlOA-3 rocket engines , i nc lud ing  t h e i r  hydrau l i c  
a c t u a t o r s  (only i f  t h e  engines break o f f  at  t h e  t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e ) .  
c. R L l O A - 3  rocket engines ,  t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e ,  helium h e a t e r ,  and 
po r t ion  of  a f t  dome extending below t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e  j u n c t i o n  
(only i f  engines do not b r e a k  o f f  a t  t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e ) .  
d. Ullage rockets-loaded. 
e. Ullage rockets-expended. 
f .  E lec t ron ic s  rack and units (one p i e c e )  l oca t ed  on t h e  forward 
i n t e r s t a g e  assembly (only i f  ‘the rack breaks o f f  a t  t h e  forward 
i n t e r s t a g e  assembly). 
g. E l e c t r o n i c  u n i t s  , such as t h e  instrumentat ion s i g n a l  cond i t ion ing  
equipment l o c a t e d  outs ide o f  t h e  t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e  (only i f  t h e  wi ts  
break off  a t  t h e  t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e ) .  
h. Thrust  s t r u c t u r e ,  including e l e c t r o n i c  equipment and accesso r i e s  
mounted i n s i d e  and a t  t h a t  po r t ion  of  t h e  a f t  dome extending below 
t h e  t h r u s t  s t ruc tu r ;  j unc t ion ;  excluding engines , e x t e r n a l  
e l e c t r o n i c s  packages , helium h e a t e r  and c o n t r o l  helium sphere 
(only i f  t h e  excluded u n i t s  break o f f  at t h e  t h r u s t  s t r u c t u r e ) .  
i. Cold helium spheres .  
j. LH2 t ank  makeup helium b o t t l e .  
k. Pneumatic c o n t r o l  sphere. 
r 
1. Helium h e a t e r .  
m. A l l  s t r u c t u r e  forward of DAC s t a t i o n  337.781, inc lud ing  useful load. 
n. Base hea t  s h i e l d .  
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5 . 5  Fragment Velocity Increments Before Stage Separat ion 
4 
A t h e o r e t i c a l  method f o r  determining t h e  v e l o c i t y  increments imparted t o  t h e  
S-IV s t a g e  components or s t a g e  fragments ( p i e c e s )  by i n i t i a t i o n  of t h e  f l i g h t  
terminat ion system was developed. By assuming t h a t  t h e  v e l o c i t y  increment 
imparted t o  a reference p i ece  w a s  known, a ' r e l a t i o n s h i p  between t h e  increment 
of t h e  reference p i ece  t o  t h e  increment o f  a l l  o t h e r  pieces  w a s  e s t a b l i s h e d  
r ega rd le s s  of t h e i r  d e n s i t y ,  t h i c k n e s s ,  and curvature .  The r e l a t i o n s h i p  w a s  
made with the  following equat ion:  
Q 
(1 1 A V  = F ;At 
where : 
b V  = t h e  v e l o c i t y  increment imparted t o  a p i ece  
F = t h e  fo rces  e x e r t e d  on a p i ece  due t o  s t a g e  explosion 
or breakup 
g = g r a v i t a t i o n a l  a c c e l e r a t i o n  
W = p iece  weight 
A t  = t h e  time increment au r ing  which t h e  fo rces  ( F )  a c t  on a 
p i ece  
A s  s w i n g  : 
( 2 )  F = PA 
where : 
P = t h e  p re s su re  a c t i n g  upon a p i ece  due t o  s t a g e  breakup or 
prope l l an t  detonat ion.  ( P  i s  assumed constant  f o r  a l l  p i e c e s . )  
A = t h e  e f f e c t i v e  a r e a  of a p i e c e ;  i . e .  , t h e  p r o j e c t e d  area of 
t h e  p i ece  
and t h a t :  
( 3 )  W = A ' T p  
where : 
P =  p iece  densi ty  
19 A p r i l  1965 
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T = p iece  th i ckness  
A '  = p iece  a c t u a l  s u r f a c e  area; i . e . ,  t h e  p i e c e  s i d e  which i s  
o r i e n t e d  toward t h e  p re s su re  source 
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Then, combining equations (11, (21, and (3) 
(I It may be seen from equation (4) tha t  t h e  velocity increment ( V )  i s  d i rec t ly  
proportional t o  t h e  r a t i o  of t he  projected area of the  piece t o  i t s  ac tua l  
surface area ( A / A ' ) ,  a r a t i o  tha t  i s  a function of t he  piece shape. 
be assumed t h a t  pieces of the  S-IV stage w i i l  have three  basic shapes: 
spherical, and cylindrical .  
A the actual surface area (- may be determined as follows: A'  
It may 
* f l a t ,  
The r a t i o  of t he  piece shape projected area t o  
a. f l a t  piece 
b. 
A - = 1  
A' 
spherical  piece 
A r - h/2 
A r ( f o r  h s r )  
- =  
where : 
r = radius of the  spherical section 
h = height of the  spherical section 
c. cy l indr ica l  piece ' 
where : 
e= cent ra l  angle of t h e  cy l indr ica l  section (radians) 
Effects of RSFT 
The r a t i o  of t h e  velocity increments imparted t o  two pieces is:  
The various stage pieces are separated i n t o  two categories f o r  t h i s  study. 
These categories are: 
cylindrical  tank w a l l ,  e t c . ,  and 
ullage rockets, e tc .  
(1) s k i n  pieces such as those originating from the 
(2 )  spec i f i c  pieces s ~ c h  8.s hel ium spheres, 
The stage skin i s  divided i n t o  several sections as 
19 April 1965 
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i n d i c a t e d  i n  f i g u r e  5-1. 
imparted t o  any s k i n  p i ece  i s ' a  funct ion of t h e  area r a t i o  ( A / A ' )  and t h e  
density-thickness product ( T ) .  Each s k i n  s e c t i o n  i s  assumed t o  have a 
densi ty- thickness  product ( T) which i s  constant  throughout t h e  s e c t i o n .  
Therefore,  s k i n  p i eces  from any given s e c t i o n  y i l l  r ece ive  v e l o c i t y  
increments which are a func t ion  only of t h e i r  a r e a  r a t i o .  
any given s e c t i o n  a r e  assumed t o  be approximately square.  
t h i ckness  products of  t h e  s p e c i f i c  pieces  were found by d i v i d i n g  t h e  t o t a l  
p i ece  weight by an assumed area f o r  each p i e c e ,  where t h e  assumed area i s  
r ep resen ta t ive  o f  t h e  p i ece  p r o j e c t e d  a r e a .  Therefore  a l l  s p e c i f i c  p i eces  
have area r a t i o s  ( A / A ' )  equa l  t o  one. The s k i n  s e c t i o n s  and t h e  s p e c i f i c  
p i eces  considered, are l i s t e d  i n  t a b l e  5-2 along with t h e i r  dens i ty -  
t h i ckness  products , assumed shapes , s k i n  p i ece  maximum s i z e  ¶ s p e c i f i c  p i ece  
weight , and s p e c i f i c  p i ece  r e p r e s e n t a t i v e  areas. 
It has been shown t h a t  t h e  v e l o c i t y  increment 
Skin p i eces  from 
The densi ty-  
Use o f  t h e  r e fe rence  p i ece  v e l o c i t y  increment t o g e t h e r  w i th  equat ion ( 6 ) ,  
t h e  area r a t i o  equat ions and t h e  p i ece  densi ty- thickness  product d a t a  of 
t a b l e  5-2, permits  determinat ion of  t h e  est imated v e l o c i t y  increments 
imparted t o  s k i n  p i eces  and t h e  s p e c i f i c  p i e c e s .  
The assumptions t h a t  a l l  p i eces  f e e l  t h e  same p r e s s u r e  ( P ) ,  and t h e  values  
assumed f o r  t h e  densi ty- thickness  product ( T )  of  p i eces  such as t h e  engines 
and u l l a g e  rocke t s  , are not t o t a l l y  c o r r e c t .  However, it i s  c o m i d e r e d  t h a t  
use of  these assumptions would r e s u l t  i n  determinat ion of  p i e c e  v e l o c i t y  
increments t h a t  are wi th in  t h e  accuracy of t h e  r e fe rence  p i e c e  v e l o c i t y  
increment determination. 
5 .5 .1  Propel lant  Tank Pieces  With P rope l l an t  Detonation 
It has been assumed t h a t  a 1.000 f t / s e c  v e l o c i t y  increment is  imparted t o  
a 1 sq f t  piece of t h e  LH2 t ank  w a l l  ( r e f e rence  p i e c e ) .  
v e l o c i t y  increment, t h e  t o t a l  k i n e t i c  energy of  a l l  t h e  LH2 t ank  w a l l  
fragments i s  approximately: 
Assuming t h i s  
2 - -   1383 x 1.000 
2 x 32 
= 2.17 x lo7 f t / l b s  
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The energy r e l eased  by 1 l b  of  oxygen r e a c t i n g  with hydrogen is  3.9 x 106 
f t f lb s .  I f  it is  assumed t h a t  L percent  of t h i s  energy i s  t ransformed into.  
k i n e t i c  energy of  t h e  fragments,  then t h e r e  are 3.9 x 10 
a v a i l a b l e  p e r  l b  o f  oxygen. Therefore ,  t o  ob ta in  1,000 f t / s e c  v e l o c i t y ,  
4 
f t / l b s  o f  energy 
2.17 x 10 To 560 Ib o f  oxygen must r e a c t  r ap id ly  with hydrogen o r  
. 3.9 x lo)!* 
swzyzrizc,  i f  0.7 percent  of t h e  t o t a l  oxygen a v a i l a b l e  de tona te s ,  and i f  
t h e  energy t r a n s f e r  is 1 percent  e f f i c i e n t  (both percentage values  are 
i n t u i t i v e l y  assumed t o  be reasonable)  , t h e  tank s k i n  fmgments w i l l  r ece ive  
a v e l o c i t y  o f  1,000 f t / s e c .  Therefore,  it appears t h a t  a v e l o c i t y  as high 
as 1,000 f t / s e c  is  reasonable .  
The ve loc i ty  increment of 1,000 f t / s e c  imparted t o  t h e  re ference  p iece  
(1 s q  ft piece  of c y l i n d r i c a l  tank w a l l ) ,  t oge the r  with equat ion  (G), t h e  
a r e a  r a t i o  equat ions ,  and t h e  p iece  densi ty- thickness  Froduct data of  
t a b l e  5-2, were u t i l i z e d  t o  compute t h e  est imated v e l o c i t y  increments 
imparted t o  t h e  sk in  p ieces  and t h e  s p e c i f i c  p i eces .  The es t imated  
ve loc i ty  increments imparted t o  t h e  s p e c i f i c  p i eces  are presented  i n  
f i g u r e  5-2. 
5.5 .2  Stage Pieces  Without Propel lan t  Detonation 
Pieces  d ispersed  by t h e  S-IV s t a g e  breaking up without  p rope l l an t  detonat ion 
w i l l  have no apprec iab le  ve loc i ty  increments imparted t o  them. 
5.5.3 Stage P ieces  Without Breakup 
The f e w  p ieces  which w i l l  be d ispersed  by i n i t i a t i o n  of  RSFT without  s t a g e  
breakup, w i l l  have no s i g n i f i c a n t  ve loc i ty  increments imparted t o  them. 
5.6 Fragment Veloci ty  Increments Af te r  Stage Separa t ion  With Propel lan t  
Tanks Nearlv F u l l  
I n i t i a t i o n  of t h e  RSFT after s t a g e  sepa ra t ion  and with t h e  s t a g e  p rope l l an t  
t anks  nea r ly  f u l l ,  w i l l  not  r e s u l t  i n  s t a g e  breakup, and debr i s  which w i l l  
be d ispersed  at  t h i s  t i m e  w i l l  have no s i g n i f i c a n t  v e l o c i t y  increments 
imparted t o  them. 
19 A p r i l  1965 
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5 .7  Fragment Veloc i ty  Increments Af t e r  Stage Separat ion With Propel lan t  
Tanks Nearly Empty 
A t  t i m e  of d e s t r u c t ,  t h e  shaped charge w i l l  cu t  a s l o t  a long t h e  LH2 tank  
w a l l .  The tank  w a l l ,  now unsupported i n  t h i s  reg ion ,  w i l l  s t a r t  t o  break 
up and t h e  p ieces  w i l l  be  acce le ra t ed .  This acce le ra t ion  w i l l  be accompa- 
n i ed  by vent ing of t h e  gases .  
of  t h e  p i eces ,  i t  i s  assumed t h a t  t h e r e  i s  no gas leakage f o r  t h e  f i r s t  
one-half i n .  of t r a v e l  and t h a t  t h e  gas p re s su re  i s  decreased ins tan taneous ly  
t o  zero a f t e r  one-half i n .  of t r a v e l .  
For t h e  purpose of  e s t ima t ing  t h e  , re loci ty  
I n i t i a l  rad ius  of  LII2 tank  ( r  ) = 110 i n .  
F ina l  rad ius  of LH2 tank  ( r  ) = 110.5  i n .  




V 2 2 
1 W r l  h r - =  = 1 = 1.009 
2 
'0 II ro h 
The k i n e t i c  energy t r ansmi t t ed  t a  t h e  w a l l  dur ing  t h e  f i r s t  one-half i n .  of  
t r a v e l  w i l l  be:  




Effec t s  of RSFT 
= 40 X 1 4 4  X 4270 In  1.009 
The approximate ve loc i ty  o f  t h e  fragments ,  t h e r e f o r e ,  w i l l  be:  
w 2  
Q 
K.E. = 1/2 - v 
v =JK' 
W 
= J2 x 2.2 x 1 0 5  x 32 
1380 
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The velocity increment of 100 f t / s e c  imparted t o  t h e  reference piece 
(1 sq ft piece of cylindrical  tank wall) ,  together with equation (61, the  
area r a t i o  equations and t h e  piece density-thickness product data of 
t ab le  5-2, were u t i l i zed  t o  compute t h e  estimated velocity increment 
imparted t o  skin pieces and the specific pieces. 
5.8 General Comments 
The velocity increment of a given skin section, as shown i n  figure 5-2 
varies a maximum of 10 percent w i t h  an increase.of piece surface area from 
1 f t2  t o  100 ft2, 
type of breakup before stage separation are considerably smaller (10 sq ft) 
than those f o r  the  pressure vessel explosive type of breakup af ter  separa- 
t ion .  It may also be seen from figure 5-2 t h a t  the  velocity increment 
variation between constant density-thickness product skin pieces i s  
negligible f o r  a propellant detonation type of breakup. It i s  concluded 
t h a t  the  velocity increment imparted t o  any skin piece is  a strong function 
of t he  density-thickness product of t he  piece and i s  nearly independent of 
piece surface area. 
The skin pieces anticipated f o r  the propellant detonation 
5.9 
In  order t o  obtain engine ign i t ion ,  the engine p re s t a r t  and start valves 
must be open, an i g n i t i a  source must be available,  and adequate propellant 
pump i n l e t  conditions m u s t  be achieved. 
(which is  common t o  both stages) t o  the  command destruct receivers causes 
an " A l l  Engine Cutoff Command" t o  be generated i n  the S-IV stage. 
c=.---?c! c lec+r ics l ly  d i  sRbles a l l  enRine p res t a r t  , star t ,  and ign i t ion  
c i r cu i t s .  
Poss ib i l i ty  of Engine Ignition i n  the  Event of Destruct Action 
The RF arm and cutoff command 
This 
Therefore, S-IV engine ign i t ion  w i l l  not occur i f  destruct action is taken 
during the S-I boost phase, unless both the  S-I and S-IV command destruct 
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TABLE 5-1 
SKIN DESCRIPTIONS 
LOCAT I O N  
Forward I n t  erst  age Assembly 
Forward Dome 
Cylindrical  Tank 
Commm Bulkhead 
Center Portion of A f t  Dome 
A f t  Interstage Assembly 
and A f t  Sk i r t  Assembly 
Lower Portion of A f t  Dome 
Upper Portion of A f t  Dome 
CONSTRUCTION 
~ 
1-in. aluminum honeycomb 
1/4-in. aluminum p la t e ,  
par t  i a l l y  waffled and 
reduced ( 3/4-in. insula- 
t i o n  ins iae  tank) .  
1/2-in. aluminum p la t e  I 
waffled ( 3/4-in. insula- 
t i o n  inside tank) .  
1-in. aluminum and 
f iberglass  honFy comb. 
1/4-in. aluminum p la t e ,  
p a r t i  a l l y  reduced . 
1.6-in. aluminum 
honeycomb. 
0.086-in. aluminum pla te .  
1/4-in. aluminum p la t e ,  
waffled (3/4-in. insula- 
t i o n  inside tank).  
NOTE: .Refer t o  f igure 5-1 f o r  locat ion of skin sections.  
. 
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Sect ion  6 
P r o b a b i l i t y  P r e d i c t  ions  
I n  cons ider ing  t h e  p o s s i b l e  abor t  s i t u a t i o n s  dur ing  S-IV s t a g e  f l i g h t ,  it i s  
necessary t o  p r e d i c t  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  of  var ious  events  which are r e l a t e d  t o  
s t a g e  loss and t h e  opera t ion  of  t he  range safety f l i g h t  te rmina t ion  system i n  
t h e  S-IV s t a g e .  The p r o b a b i l i t y  pred ic t ions  of  t h e s e  events  are included i n  
t a b l e s  v-1, 6-2, and 6-3 and are based upoq t h e  ground rules a n d  t h e  informa- 
t i o n  contained i n  t h e  DSV-l+ R e l i a b i l i t y  Mathematical Model, DAC drawing 
110. '1859,175, change l e t t e r  C ,  and t h e  Mathematical Model Supplement, DAC 
drawing No. 1A6$113. It s-hould be noted t h a t  t h e  ground r u l e s  assume t h a t  
t h e  S-IV s t a g e  has  one-engine-out and one-flight-control-subsystem-out 
c a p a b i l i t y  which i s  concurrent ly  appl icable  f o r  t h e  same engine,  bu t  no t  for 
difl 'ei-ent engines.  
o u t  pr-obabil i t y  p r e d i c t i o n .  The aforementioned documents r e f l e c t  a genera l  
S-IV stap:e r a t h e r  t h a n  a s p e c i f i c  conf igura t ion ;  as o f  t h i s  repor t  d a t a ,  
t h e  s p e c i f i c  r e l i a b i l i t y  pred ic t ions  fo r  t h e  S-IV s t a g e  a r e  not a v a i l a b l e .  
For  comparison, t a b l e  6-1 a l s o  inc ludes  t h e  no-engine- 
0.1 Vehicle Loss and Mission Loss--Definition 
';Lo types  of' o v e r a l l  loss a r e  considered i n  t h e  R e l i a b i l i t y  Mathematical 
ilodel--Failure Effec t  Analysis ; namely, v e h i c l e  loss ani! mission l o s s .  For 
t h e  purpose of  t h i s  r e p o r t ,  vehicle  loss  i s  def ined as t h e  r e s u l t  of  s t a g e  
loss a t t r i b u t e d  t o  s t a g e  breakup or explosion.  Mission loss  i s  defin'ed as 
t h e  r e s u l t  o f  a s t a g e  l o s s  a t t r i b u t e d  t o  t h e  loss of  engine t h r u s t  or 
excessive d e v i a t i o n  from t h e  intended f l i g h t  path.  The l a t t e r  d e f i n i t i o n  
differs frorr. t h e  mathematical model d e f i n i t i o n  s i n c e  it is, assumed h e r e  t h a t  
HSFT a c t i o n  w i l l  be  accomplished before  t h e  s t a g e  breaks up. 
6.2 Discussion of  Resul ts  
Table 6-1 inc ludes  t h e  pred ic t ions  f o r  t h e  complete S-IV stage system. 
( 2 )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  s t a g e  loss may occur  3.7 times ou t  of 100 missions.  
( 3 )  i n d i c a t e s  t h a t  v e h i c l e  loss p r o b a b i l i t y  i s  not a f f e c t e d  by t h e  change 
i n  engine-out s t a t u s .  
I t e m  ( 5 )  shows the percentage of s t a g e  loss t h a t  may r e s u l t  i n  v e h i c l e  loss 
(explosion o r  breakup) before  RSFT ac t ion .  
i n a i c a t e s  t n a i  i oui, u f  22 a t a g e  1csses i s  e v e h i c l e  loss type.  Due t o  t h e  
Item 
Item 
Vehicle loss  may occur  6 times ou t  of' 100 missions.  
For  example, 4.6 percent  
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extremely s h o r t  f a i l u r e  r e a c t i o n  t ime ( r e f e r  t o  Mathematical Model f o r  
s p e c i f i c  FRT's), i n  many cases RSFT a c t i o n  may r.ot be p o s s i b l e  be fo re  the.  
veh ic l e  breaks up. 
Table 6-2 i s  t h e  counterpar t  of t a b l e  6-1, excluding t h e  airf rame and t h e  
t h r u s t  generation subsystems (ELli)A-3 Rocket Engines ) . 
appear i n  t a b l e  6-2 cons ide r  a l l  t h e  f a i l u r e  , e f f e c t  s ta tements  included i n  
t h e  Mathematical Model. Because of p o s s i b l e  unknowns i n  t h e  a c t u a l  loads 
nnc! cnvironmental condi t ions t o  which t h e  S-IV s t a g e  airframe w i l l  be 
exposed fo r  t h e  du ra t ion  of  i t s  mission, a p e s s i m i s t i c  po in t  of  view w a s  
assumed. For pred ic t ion  purposes,  a l l  of  t h e  air f rame u n r e l i a b i l i t y  was 
a s s o c i a t e d  with v e h i c l e  l o s s .  Since s u f f i c i e n t  t e s t  d a t a  were not a v a i l a b l e  
t o  demonstrate t h e  c a p a b i l i t y  of  t h e  t h r u s t  generat ion subsystem t o  su rv ive  
t h e  c r i t i c a l  i g n i t i o n  pe r iod  ( e . g . ,  excessive t h r u s t  overshoots ,  ad j acen t  
engine i g n i t i n g  gasses  from an un ign i t ed  engine,  e t c . ) ,  it was necessary t o  
determine t h e  po r t ion  of  s i n g l e  engine u n r e l i a b i l i t y  which c o n t r i b u t e s  t o  
such ' f a i l u r e s .  Assuming t h e  worst  p o s s i b l e  c a s e ,  t h e  p r e d i c t i o n  has 
i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  approximately 5 percent  of  s i n g l e  engine f'ailures may 
c o n t r i b u t e  t o  veh ic l e  loss. For comparison purposes t h e  p r e d i c t i o n s  of t h e  
two subsystems a r e  included i n  t a b l e  6-1 bu t  not i n  t a b l e  6-2. 
I t e m  (1) i n  t a b l e  6-3 i s  t h e  p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  t h e  S-IV RSFT system w i l l  
ope ra t e  properly when c a l l e d  upon during S-I s t a g e  powered f l i g h t .  
i nc ludes  the p r o b a b i l i t y  t h a t  d e s t r u c t i o n  of t h e  S-IV s t a g e  w i l l  be i n i t i a t e d  
v i a  shock propagation from t h e  S-I s t a g e  command d e s t r u c t  subsystem or 
i n i t i a t e d  by t h e  S-IV s t a g e  should t h e  S-I s t a g e  command d e s t r u c t  subsystem 
be u n r e l i a b l e .  Item ( 2 )  i n d i c a t e s  t h e  success  p r o b a b i l i t y  of t h e  S-IV stage 
RSFT of  t h e  referenced Mathematical Model. I tem ( 3 )  cons ide r s  t h e  ex tens ion  
of t h e  S-IV s t a g e  RSFT t o  inc lude  a l l  o t h e r  S-IV s t a g e  components r e q u i r e d  
for t h e  d e s t r u c t  ope ra t ion .  This i nc ludes  such items as p a r t s  of t h e  S-IV 
s t a g e  sequencer , components of  t h e  e l e c t r i c a l  power subsystem, e t c .  













PREDICTION--ALL S-IV STAGE SUBSYSTEMS 
L 
(3) VEHICLE LOSS PROBABILITY 
( 4 )  MISSION LOSS PROBABILITY 
( 5  ) PERCENT STAGE LOSS EQUAL 
TO VMICLE LOSS 
"Analysis assumes t h a t  mission success can be achieved with one engine out. 
**Analysis assumes t h a t  mission success cannot be achieved with one engine out. 
TABLE 6-2 
PREDICTION--EXCL'JDING AIRFRAME AND THRUST GENERATION SUBSYSTEMS 
(1) NO STAGE LOSS PROBABILITY 0.9763 
(3) VEHICLE LOSS PROBABILITY 0.0008 
( 4 )  MISSION LOSS PROBABILITY 0.0229 
( 5 )  PERCENT STAGE LOSS EQUAL 3.3% 
(2 )  STAGE LOSS PROBABILITY 0.0237 
TO VEHICLE LOSS 
TABLE 6-3 
PRRIITCTION--INHERENT RELIABILITY OF RSFT SYSTEM I N  S-IV STAGE 
( 3)  AFTER S-I/S-IV SEPARATION (INCLUDING 
ALL OTHER S - N  STAGE COMPONENTS 
I 
Tables 6-1 th ru  6-3 19 Apri l  1965 
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SA- 10 (Standard) 
IMPACT DATA FOR PREMATURE CUTOFF 
Geodetic 
































































































































































































































































(SA-10 ( 3  u Maximum) 
IMPACT DATA FOR PREMATURE CUTOFF 
Geodetic Remaining 
Latitude Longitude Flight Time 
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SA-10 (3 CJ Minimum) 
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CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
TKE LATERAI, DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 19 
(-By of 11.5,  10, 7, 3, 1,  .5) a t  To = 16 
CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
( -By  of 11.5, 10, 7, 3, 1, .5) at To = 20 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 20 
CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
(-p of 11.5, 10, 7 ,  3, 1, .5 )  a t  T o - =  24 Y 
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CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 






CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 23 
(-By of 11.5, 10, 7,  3, 1, .5 )  a t  To = 32 
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CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
(-p.. of 11 .5 ,  10, 7 ,  3 ,  1 ,  . 5 )  a t  T i  = 36 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 24 
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CHANGE IN TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION IN 
TRE LATERAZ, DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION M m  25 
(-py of 11.*5, 10, 7,  3,  1, . 5 )  at  To = 40 
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CHANGE I N  TOTAL V E L O C I T I  VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 26 
/ (-Py of 11.5, 10, 7, 3, 1, .5) at To = 44 
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CHANGE IN TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION IN 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR 




CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITI  VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS. TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 28 




CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION,IN 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
(-p of 11.5, 10, 7, 3, I, .5) at T i  = 56 Y 
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C " G E  IN TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 30 
(+, of 11.5, 10, 7, 3 ,  1, .5) at To = 60 
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CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LA- DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 31 
(-py of 11.5, 10, 7 ,  3,  1, . 5 )  a t  To = 64 
R I  LT. 
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a2 CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
( - 1 3 ~  of 11.5, 10, 7, 3, 1, .5) at To = 68 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 32 
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CHANGE IN TOTAL VEZOCITY VECTOR ORIEKTATION IN 
(-By of 11.5, 10, 7, 3, 1, 3)  a t  To = 72 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR  TIO ON FIGURE 33 
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CHANGE IN TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION IN 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 34 
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THE LATERAC DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
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CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 36 / 
( - B y  of 11.5, 10, 7, 3, 1, .5) at To = 84 
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CHANGE I N  TOT& VELOCI* VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
(-ey of 11.5, 10, 7,  3, 1, -5) at  To = 88 THE W E R A I .  DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 37 
CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
(-py of 11.5, 10, 7, 3, 1, .5) at To = 92 




CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
(-By of 11.5, 10, 7, 3 ,  1, .5) a t  To = 96 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 39 





CHANGE IN TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION IN 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 40 
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THE LATERAT.. DIRECTION VERSUS. TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 
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CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 46 
(+, of 11.5, 10, 7, 3, 1, .5) at To = 124 
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THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFVNCTION FIGURE 
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CHANGE IN TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION IN 
THE L A T E W  DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 48 / 
(-py of 11.5, 10, 7 ,  3 ,  1, .5) at To = 132 
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. 99 CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 49 
(-py of 11.5, 10, 7,  3,  1, .5 )  a t  To = 136 /-=- 
100 CHANGE IN TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION IN 
THE L A T E W  DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 50 
(-pY of 6 ,  4 ,  2, 1) at To = 180 





CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 51 /... (-pY of 6, 4, 2 ,  1) a t  To = 200 
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CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 52 
(-By of 6 ,  4 ,  2 ,  1) a t  To = 220 
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CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 54 
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CHANGE IN TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION IN 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 55 
(-$y of 6, 4 ,  2, 1) at To = 280 
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TFE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALF'UNCTION FIGURE 57 
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CHANGE I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 58 
(-Py of 6, 4 ,  2 ,  1) at To = 340 
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FIGURE 59 
CHANGE IN TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION IN 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
(-py Of 6 ,  4, 2, 1) a t  To 360 
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THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 60 
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113 CHANGE IN TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION IN 
(-pY of 6, 4, 2, 1) at To = 440 
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CHANGE IN TOTAL VEOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION IN 
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 68 
(+, of 6, 4 ,  2, 1) at To = 540 
7 
119 
C " G E  I N  TOTAL VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION I N  
THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 69 / 
(+, of 6, 4, 2 ,  1) at To = 560 
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THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
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THE LATERAL DIRECTION VERSUS TIME FOR MALFUNCTION FIGURE 71 
CHANGE IN TOT& VELOCITY VECTOR ORIENTATION IN 
(+, of 6, 4, 2, 1) at To = 600 ,/ 
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EARTH-FIXED VELOCITY AS A FUNCTION OF TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
(-By of 11.5, 10 ,  7, 3, 1, .5) at  To = 20 FIGURE 14 
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EARTH-FIXED VELOCITY AS A FUNCTION OF TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
(-py of 11.5, 10, 7, 3, I, . 5 )  at To = 24 FIGURE 75 
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EARTH-FIXED VELOCITY AS A FUNCTION OF TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
(-py of 11.5, 10, 7,  3 ,  1, .5) a t  T = 36 FIGURE 78 
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EARTH-FIXED VELWIT~ AS A FUNCTION OF-TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
(-By of 11.5, 10, 7, 3, 1, .5) at To = 48 FIGURE 81 
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EARTH-FIXED VELudTTY AS A FUNCTION OF TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
(-By of 11.5, 10, 7, 3 ,  1, .5) a t  To = 68 FIGURE 86 
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EARTH-FIXED VELOCITY AS A FUNCTION OF TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
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EARTH-FIXED VELOC!lTk AS A FUNCTION OF TIME FOR MALFUNCTION 
(-By of 11.5, 10, 7, 3 ,  1, . 5 )  at To = 100 FIGURE 94 
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(-f3 of 6 ,  4 ,  2 ,  1) a t  To = 580 FIGURE 124 
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